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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE* 
Amici are Members of Congress committed to en-
forcing Congress’ long-standing judgment that sexual 
violence has no place in the military and that no stat-
ute of limitations bars its prosecution.  To this end, 
amici have all been involved in legislative efforts in 
this area and seek to defend Congress’ decades-old 
policy of requiring punishment for rape in the military 
no matter how long ago the offense occurred. 
Amici are: 
• Rep. Brian Mast (R-FL) 
• Rep. James R. Baird (R-IN) 
• Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) 
• Rep. Gilbert R. Cisneros Jr. (D-CA) 
• Rep. Charlie Crist (D-FL) 
• Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL) 
• Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO) 
• Rep. Denny Heck (D-WA) 
• Rep. Kendra S. Horn (D-OK) 
• Rep. Ann McLane Kuster (D-NH) 
• Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA) 
• Rep. Haley Stevens (D-MI) 
• Rep. Ted Yoho (D-FL) 
                                                
 * Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that 
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or 
counsel for any party.  No person or party other than amici or 
their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation 
or submission of this brief.  Respondents have granted blanket 
consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs and amici have re-
ceived the written consent of the Government in accord with Su-
preme Court Rule 37.3. 
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STATEMENT 
1. In 2005, Air Force officer Michael Briggs went 
to the room of a member of his squadron and forced 
her to have sex with him—ignoring her exclamations 
of “no” and “stop” and her attempts to roll away from 
him.  The rape was so violent that she bled for days; 
she was so bruised and swollen that she was unable 
to sit down.  In 2000, Air Force course instructor Rich-
ard Collins pushed a student in his course against the 
wall, threw her to the floor, and struck her on the face 
before brutally raping her.  And in 1998, Air Force air-
man Humphrey Daniels raped a civilian in the com-
munity near his air base—in the same bed where her 
child was sleeping. 
2. Rape is always an evil and devastating 
crime—but the harm is compounded when it occurs in 
the highly regimented environment of the military, 
which stresses the imperative of respecting and defer-
ring to authority.  In a setting designed to inculcate 
swift and unquestioning obedience, rape is a uniquely 
harmful betrayal of trust. 
For too long, these dynamics have frequently de-
terred survivors from reporting rape in the military.  
Because many survivors fear that their careers will be 
damaged if they report a rape committed by a supe-
rior, egregious criminal conduct all too often goes un-
punished—depriving survivors of justice and poison-
ing the cohesion and effectiveness of the military. 
Both Congress and the military have long been 
aware of these tragic realities.  When the rapes in this 
case were committed, Articles 43(a) and 120(a) of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) treated 
rape as an “offense punishable by death” to which no 
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statute of limitations applied.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces adopted that view twice over, 
reasoning in Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152 
(C.A.A.F. 1998), and United States v. Stebbins, 61 
M.J. 366 (C.A.A.F. 2005), that the UCMJ recognized 
no temporal limitation on prosecutions for rape.  In 
2006, Congress amended the UCMJ to further clarify 
that no statute of limitations applies to rape in the 
military.  See National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2006 (2006 NDAA) § 553(a), Pub. L. No. 
109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, 3264. 
3. Following that amendment, the three survi-
vors in these cases came forward—and justice was 
served.  In 2014, 2016, and 2017, courts-martial found 
Briggs, Collins, and Daniels guilty of rape, dismissed 
them from the Air Force, and sentenced them to con-
finement. 
But in 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces broke from long-standing consensus and im-
ported civilian death-penalty jurisprudence into the 
context of military discipline.  Because this Court has 
held that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose 
the death penalty for rape in the civilian context, the 
court of appeals reasoned that rape no longer consti-
tutes an “offense punishable by death” under the 
UCMJ, and so—in contravention of the statute’s clear 
text and Congress’ important purposes—the court of 
appeals grafted a five-year statute of limitations onto 
the crime of rape in the military. 
4. That decision reflects a profound misunder-
standing of the governing legal framework that will 
have grave consequences if permitted to stand. 
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First, the decision ignores the relevant text, struc-
ture, and legislative history to reach a conclusion 
wholly alien to the meaning of the UCMJ.  Although 
this Court has the authority to decide which punish-
ments may be constitutionally imposed for particular 
offenses, the power to determine which punishments 
are warranted belongs to Congress—particularly in 
the context of the military, which the Constitution ex-
plicitly tasks Congress with regulating.  The court of 
appeals erred by rewriting statutory text and oblite-
rating these congressional judgments. 
Second, the decision overrides a congressional de-
termination—that no statute of limitations bars the 
prosecution of rape in the military—which rests on 
critical policy judgments about the harms caused by 
rape in the military.  In addition to the profound 
harms suffered by individual victims, rape has a dev-
astating effect on unit cohesion and morale, and the 
military’s hierarchical structure tends to deter survi-
vors from coming forward.  Recognizing these devas-
tating harms, Congress adopted a policy of treating 
rape in the military as an “offense punishable by 
death”—and nothing permits, much less requires, 
that policy judgment to be set aside. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Constitution entrusts Congress with author-
ity over military discipline, including the authority to 
determine what (if any) statutes of limitations apply 
to crimes that occur within the military.  By classify-
ing rape as an “offense punishable by death” and stip-
ulating that “offenses punishable by death” are not 
subject to statutes of limitations, Congress en-
trenched the policy that rape within the military is not 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519376 
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subject to any statute of limitations at all.  Whether 
the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed for 
the rape of an adult—an open question in the special-
ized military context—is wholly irrelevant to the key 
question here:  Whether Congress determined that 
the death penalty is warranted for rape in the mili-
tary.  In answering “no,” the court below flouted the 
text, structure, and history of the statute; departed 
from long-standing precedent (including its own); and 
overrode Congress’ policy judgment on a matter of 
grave importance to both service members as individ-
uals and the military as a whole. 
Congress’ policy judgment—that rape within the 
military is so heinous and so damaging to military ef-
fectiveness that no temporal restriction should be 
placed on its prosecution—is entitled to respect.  Rape 
in the military has devastating effects on survivors in-
dividually and military readiness generally.  And the 
military’s hierarchical command structure can exac-
erbate the understandable reluctance of rape survi-
vors to come forward and report the crimes committed 
against them.  In light of those considerations, the 
provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
that address rape in the military have been under-
stood for decades to reflect Congress’ intent that those 
who commit the crime of rape should not be permitted 
to escape justice by hiding behind the passage of time.  
This Court should interpret the Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice to reflect that intent and fulfill Congress’ 
exceedingly important purposes in declining to subject 
the prosecution of rape in the military to temporal 
limitation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION BELOW UNDERMINES 
CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY OVER MILITARY 
DISCIPLINE BY REWRITING THE UNIFORM 
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. 
The Constitution vests authority over the frame-
work of military discipline exclusively in Congress.  
Article I expressly assigns to Congress the power “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.  
Accordingly, it has long been recognized that “the Leg-
islative Branch has plenary control over * * * the 
framework of the military establishment, including 
regulations, procedures and remedies related to mili-
tary discipline.”  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 
(1983).1  And this Court has deferred to congressional 
regulation of the military in myriad contexts.  See 
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1987) 
(collecting cases and detailing judicial deference to 
Congress’ regulation of the military in the areas of 
free exercise, racial discrimination, sex discrimination, 
free expression, right to counsel, and due process). 
                                                
 1 See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1957) (“Military 
law * * * exists separate and apart from the law which governs 
in our federal judicial establishment. * * * The Framers ex-
pressly entrusted that task to Congress.”); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 
U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (“Congress has the power to provide 
for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences.”); 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 777–78 (1996) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“In light of Congress’ express 
constitutional authority to regulate the Armed Forces, and the 
unique nature of the military’s mission, we have afforded an un-
paralleled degree of deference to congressional action governing 
the military.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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Congress’ power to regulate military discipline 
goes hand in hand with its power to establish statutes 
of limitations that govern the prosecution of improper 
conduct.  Statutes of limitations “reflect[ ] a policy 
judgment by the legislature” regarding when (if at all) 
“the lapse of time” renders “criminal acts ill suited for 
prosecution.”  Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 
112 (2013). 
The decision below seriously undermines Con-
gress’ plenary authority over military discipline by er-
roneously imposing a five-year limitations period on 
prosecuting rapes in the military perpetrated before 
2006.  As text, structure, and history all make abun-
dantly clear, that most certainly was not Congress’ in-
tent.  Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 
(1979) (statutes of limitations should be given “effect 
in accordance with what [the Court] can ascertain the 
legislative intent to have been”). 
Congress considers rape in the military to be 
among the most heinous offenses that can be commit-
ted, and its express constitutional authority to regu-
late military discipline is seriously eroded when 
courts fail to apply its enactments by their plain and 
unmistakable terms. 
A. Statutory Text And Structure Unmis-
takably Reflect Congress’ Determina-
tion That No Statute Of Limitations 
Should Apply To Rape In The Military. 
At the time respondents raped their victims, the 
text of the UCMJ unambiguously reflected Congress’ 
determination that rape in the military is not subject 
to a statute of limitations.  Article 120 provided that 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519376 
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rape “shall be punished by death or such other pun-
ishment as a court-martial may direct.”  10 U.S.C. 
§ 920(a) (1994 & 2000).2  And Article 43 stated that 
“any offense punishable by death[ ] may be tried and 
punished at any time without limitation.”  10 U.S.C. 
§ 843(a) (1994 & 2000) (emphasis added).3 
Those two clauses plainly expressed Congress’ 
policy determination that rape is so repugnant—and 
so destructive to military readiness—that perpetra-
tors cannot be shielded by any statute of limitations.  
For over two decades, the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces read those two interdependent clauses 
to mean exactly what they said.  See Willenbring, 48 
M.J. at 178–80 (“rape is an ‘offense punishable by 
                                                
 2 Rape in the military has been punishable by death for “more 
than a century.”  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 945, 946 (2008) 
(statement of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, JJ., respecting the denial of rehearing) (citing Enroll-
ment Act § 30, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863)); see also Gov’t Br. 
34.  When Congress first enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it made rape 
in the military committed during peacetime punishable by death 
as well.  See Act of May 5, 1950 (1950 UCMJ) art. 120(a), ch. 169, 
Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (“Any person subject 
to this code who commits an act of sexual intercourse * * * by force 
and without [ ] consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by 
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”). 
 3 Congress eliminated the statute of limitations for all offenses 
“punishable by death” in 1986.  See National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (1987 NDAA) § 805(a), Pub. L. No. 
99-661, 100 Stat. 3816, 3908 (1986) (“A person charged with ab-
sence without leave or missing movement in time of war, or with 
any offense punishable by death, may be tried and punished at 
any time without limitation.”) (emphasis added); compare 1950 
UCMJ art. 43(a), 64 Stat. at 121 (“A person charged with deser-
tion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the 
enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished at any 
time without limitation.”). 
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death’ for purposes of exempting it from the 5–year 
statute of limitations of Article 43”); Stebbins, 61 M.J. 
at 369 (reaffirming Willenbring). 
Then, in 2018, the court of appeals reversed 
course and held—contrary to the statutes’ plain text 
and Congress’ clear intent—that the crime of rape in 
the military is subject to a five-year statute of limita-
tions.  United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222–25 
(C.A.A.F. 2018) (overruling Willenbring and Stebbins 
and holding that “rape is not exempt from the five-year 
statute of limitations”).  The court reached that new 
conclusion by importing this Court’s civilian death-
penalty jurisprudence into the military context.  The 
court reasoned that—because executing a civilian rap-
ist would violate the Eighth Amendment under this 
Court’s precedents—rape in the military could not 
technically be “punishable by death,” which meant 
that a limitations period must apply.  Ibid. (citing 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)).4 
The court of appeals’ decision is profoundly 
flawed.  For one thing, its approach to statutory inter-
pretation makes little sense.  The court of appeals 
held, in essence, that the meaning of the statutory 
phrase “punishable by death” turned not on the pun-
ishment Congress explicitly authorized in the UCMJ, 
but instead on whether the court of appeals thought 
this Court would deem that punishment constitution-
ally permissible.  Id. at 223 (rape not “punishable by 
death” because although “the UCMJ authorized the 
                                                
 4 Amici agree with the Government that the court of appeals 
erred by importing civilian death-penalty jurisprudence into the 
military-discipline context.  See Gov’t Br. 22–23, 31–39; see also 
Briggs Pet. 16–20; Collins Pet. 14. 
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death sentence[ ] for rape, * * * such punishment can-
not be constitutionally inflicted”).  In so doing, the 
court endorsed an approach to interpretation that 
would make it virtually impossible for courts to ascer-
tain the meaning of any statute with certainty, as it 
would require overlaying predicted constitutional out-
comes on top of the text that Congress actually 
adopted. 
For another thing, Congress’ meaning was per-
fectly clear.  The interlocking provisions of Articles 43 
and 120 make plain that—for limitations purposes—
Congress intended the phrase “punishable by death” 
to be defined statutorily, not judicially.  At the time 
respondents raped their victims, Article 43 provided 
that there was no limitation on prosecuting offenses 
that Congress deemed so detrimental to military read-
iness that they were “punishable by death.”  10 U.S.C. 
§ 843(a) (1994 & 2000).  By providing that rape could 
“be punished by death,” Article 120 conveyed Con-
gress’ determination that rape was precisely that type 
of offense.  10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1994 & 2000).5 
Neither the Mangahas decision, nor any of the re-
spondents in this case, offers a coherent reason why 
Congress would have intended the application of the 
UCMJ’s statute of limitations to turn on past and fu-
ture judicial determinations about whether an of-
fense’s maximum punishment would be constitution-
ally permissible.  More logically, application of the 
                                                
 5 Further highlighting the differences between the civilian and 
military contexts is the fact that Article 43 also provided that no 
statute of limitation applied to offenses that have no parallel in 
the civilian context, like being absent without leave and missing 
movement in a time of war.  10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1994 & 2000). 
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UCMJ’s statute of limitations turns on the punish-
ment authorized by the UCMJ itself.  After all, it is an 
elementary principle of statutory interpretation that 
the UCMJ, “like every Act of Congress, should not be 
read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions,” 
but rather as a whole.  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561, 570 (1995). 
Other courts have recognized this principle and 
acknowledged that whether an offense is “punishable 
by death” (or qualifies as a “capital” offense) for limi-
tations purposes turns on the statutorily authorized 
punishments for the offense, not on whether a death 
sentence would be constitutionally permissible.  See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282.  In United States v. Manning, 
for example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
If the statute’s purpose derives from the na-
ture of the offense with which the defendant 
is charged and not from the potential severity 
of the punishment, it remains in effect.  After 
all, in a very literal sense, the offense defined 
[in the criminal statute] is still a “capital 
crime;” the statute still authorizes the imposi-
tion of the death penalty and Congress has not 
repealed it. 
56 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations, 
quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also 
United States v. Gallaher, 624 F.3d 934, 940–41 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“ ‘punishable by death’ is a calibration of 
the seriousness of the crime as viewed by Congress, 
not of the punishment that could actually be imposed 
on the defendant in an individual case”); United States 
v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n de-
termining whether an offense is ‘punishable by death’ 
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* * * we look to the character of the offense and the 
penalties that are set out by statute.  An offense ‘pun-
ishable by death,’ within the meaning of § 3281, is one 
for which the statute authorizes death as a punish-
ment, regardless of whether the death penalty is 
sought by the prosecution or ultimately found appro-
priate by the factfinder or the court.”); United States 
v. Ealy, 363 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir. 2004) (“whether a 
crime is ‘punishable by death’ under § 3281 or ‘capital’ 
under § 3282 depends on whether the death penalty 
may be imposed for the crime under the enabling stat-
ute, not ‘on whether the death penalty is in fact avail-
able for defendants in a particular case’ ”).6 
In sum, the operative text and structure of the 
UCMJ plainly reflect Congress’ intent that the prose-
cution of rape in the military is not to be subject to any 
temporal limitation. 
B. Legislative History Confirms What Stat-
utory Text Makes Plain:  Congress In-
tended No Limitation On The Prosecu-
tion Of Rape In The Military. 
In 1986, Congress amended Article 43 to elimi-
nate the statute of limitations for “any offense punish-
able by death.”  1987 NDAA § 805(a), 100 Stat. at 
3908.  Before that amendment, the UCMJ already rec-
ognized that no limitation applied to the prosecution 
of murder.  See 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1982) (“aiding the 
                                                
 6 Daniels’s attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground 
that they involve murder rather than rape is misguided.  See 
Daniels BIO 12–14.  In each case, the defendant was not eligible 
for the death penalty.  Nevertheless, each case held that the stat-
ute of limitations turned on the statutorily authorized punish-
ment—not on whether death would have been a constitutionally 
permissible punishment. 
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enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished 
at any time without limitation”).  Congress removed the 
limitations period from all offenses that were “punish-
able by death” to increase the likelihood that perpetra-
tors who committed crimes most detrimental to mili-
tary readiness would face prosecution and punishment. 
Moreover, Congress identified such offenses stat-
utorily—regardless of whether this Court might deem 
the authorized punishments constitutionally permis-
sible at some future date.  By explaining that “no stat-
ute of limitation would exist in prosecution of offenses 
for which the death penalty is a punishment pre-
scribed by or pursuant to the UCMJ,” the Senate Re-
port to the 1986 amendment affirms that Congress in-
tended Article 43 to be applied based on the UCMJ’s 
text.  S. Rep. No. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1986) 
(emphasis added).  That is also consistent with the un-
derstanding of courts—then and now—that whether 
an offense was “punishable by death” turned on the 
statutorily authorized punishment, not the constitu-
tionally permissible one.  See Coon v. United States, 
411 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3281); see also United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 
557, 557–58 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“punishable 
by death” analysis turns on “existing statutory lan-
guage” not on this Court’s constitutional interpreta-
tion) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976)). 
In 2006, Congress further amended Article 43 to 
make clear that both rape and rape of a child may 
be prosecuted without limitation.  See 2006 NDAA 
§§ 552(e)–(f), 553(a), 119 Stat. at 3263–64, codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).  Those amend-
ments followed a 2005 Department of Defense report 
that recommended adding “rape and rape of a child” 
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to Article 43 to “clarif[y]” that Willenbring “is still 
good law and that there is an unlimited statute of lim-
itations for all offenses that list death as a statutorily 
potential sentence—even if death is not a Constitu-
tionally permitted punishment.”  Dep’t of Defense, Sex 
Crimes and the UCMJ:  A Report for the Joint Service 
Committee on Military Justice 285 (2005) (“Notwith-
standing, the Coker prohibition against the death pen-
alty for rape, the military statute of limitations for rape 
of an adult female should continue to be unlimited.”).7 
Congress was clear that the purpose of the amend-
ment was not to alter the statute of limitations for 
rape in the military, but to “clarify that rape is also an 
offense with an unlimited statute of limitations.”  H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 360, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 703 (2005) 
(emphasis added).  In contrast, that same Conference 
Report stated that Congress was “extend[ing] the stat-
ute of limitations for certain child abuse offenses.”  
Ibid. (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89, 
109th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (2005) (same). 
Subsequent legislative history bears out this read-
ing.  In 2013, Congress again amended the UCMJ to 
provide—for the first time—that sexual assault in the 
military could be prosecuted without limitation.  See 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 § 1703(a), Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 671, 958 
(2013), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2012 & Supp. II 
2014) (“Elimination of five-year statute of limitations 
on trial by court-martial for additional offenses involv-
ing sex-related crimes”) (capitalization altered).  The 
Joint Explanatory Statement directly explained that 
                                                
 7 https://jpp.whs.mil/public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02-Article_120 
/20150116/58_Report_SexCrimes_UCMJ.pdf. 
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Congress was “eliminat[ing] the 5-year statute of lim-
itations * * * for sexual assault.”  Joint Explanatory 
Statement, 159 Cong. Rec. H7984, at H7949 (2013) 
(emphasis added).  Congress’ use of “eliminate” fur-
ther confirms that although Congress changed the 
limitations period applicable to sexual assault in 
2013, it merely clarified that rape in the military was 
subject to prosecution without limitation in 2006. 
The text, structure, and history of the UCMJ thus 
speak with one voice:  No temporal limitation applies 
to the prosecution of respondents’ rapes.  The court of 
appeals’ judgment to the contrary cannot stand. 
II. CONGRESS REMOVED ANY LIMITATIONS ON 
PROSECUTING RAPE IN THE MILITARY TO 
ACHIEVE CRITICAL POLICY GOALS. 
Congress’ decision to impose severe penalties for 
rape in the military rests on its judgment that this 
crime—while always abhorrent—is uniquely perni-
cious in the military environment for at least two crit-
ical reasons.  First, rape not only harms service mem-
bers as individuals but also undermines the 
discipline, morale, and good order of the military as a 
whole.  And second, the military context presents spe-
cial difficulties that contribute to persistent underre-
porting that impedes the prosecution of rape. 
A. Congress Sought To Address The 
Unique Harms Associated With Rape 
In The Military. 
Since 1986, prosecution of rape in the military has 
not been subject to any temporal limitations—embod-
ying Congress’ long-standing judgment that rape in 
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16 
 
the military is uniquely harmful and must be met 
with the severest of penalties.8 
In addition to its “devastating impact on victims,” 
rape in the military “negatively affect[s] morale, good 
order and discipline and the unit cohesion and combat 
effectiveness of military personnel and units.”  Dep’t 
of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ at 2–3; see also 
Gov’t Br. 5–6, 34–35.  Rape is “one of the most destruc-
tive factors in building a mission-focused military.”  
Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Defense, 
to All Members of Dep’t of Defense:  Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Awareness (Apr. 18, 2018).9  Then-Sec-
retary Mattis explained that “[u]nit cohesion is what 
holds us together under stress and keeps us combat 
effective when the chips are down.”  Ibid.  Sexual vio-
lence poses an existential threat to the cohesion on 
which military readiness and effectiveness depend.10 
                                                
 8 That rape in the military has been punishable by death 
“since at least 1863” reflects the seriousness with which Con-
gress has approached this heinous crime.  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 
946 (statement of Kennedy, J., respecting the denial of rehear-
ing); see also note 2. 
 9 https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_sapr 
/saap-osd004331-18-res.pdf. 
 10 About 20,500 “penetrative or contact sexual assault[s]” were 
reported across the Armed Forces in 2018, a 38 percent increase 
from 2016.  Dep’t of Defense, Annual Report on Sexual Assault 
in the Military:  Fiscal Year 2018 10 (Apr. 2019), https://www.sapr 
.mil/sites/default/files/DoD_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault 
_in_the_Military.pdf.  The Department found that just over 6 
percent of servicewomen and just under 1 percent of servicemen 
were victims of “sexual assault in the year prior to being sur-
veyed.”  Ibid.  For women, the rate of sexual assault or rape in-
creased by over 50 percent—to the highest level in over a decade.  
Ibid. 
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Unlike in the civilian context, where survivors 
can generally (though of course not always) try to 
avoid future contact with their assailants, there is no 
such latitude in the military.  A survivor of rape in the 
military “deals with the rape and the impact on her 
community and also the ongoing influence of the of-
fender on her life outside of that specific assault.”  
Dep’t of Defense, Judicial Proceedings Panel, Report 
on Retaliation Related to Sexual Assault Offenses 16 
(Feb. 2016).11 
After all, “[m]ilitary life requires that large num-
bers of young men and women live and work together 
in close quarters that are often highly isolated.”  Dep’t 
of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ at 12.  As a re-
sult, “[t]he deterrence of sexual offenses in such cir-
cumstances is critical to military efficiency.”  Ibid.  As 
then-Secretary Mattis put it, “trust [is] the coin of the 
realm and our bedrock in building a cohesive team, 
one free of denigrating behavior.”  Mattis Memoran-
dum.  When that trust is broken, the team’s effective-
ness suffers as a result. 
Above all, of course, is the profound harm rapists 
inflict on their victims.  The most common effects are 
posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxi-
ety.  Rape exacerbates the already prevalent problem 
of PTSD in the military:  about half of all women who 
have been sexually assaulted experience PTSD.  Kait-
lin A. Chivers-Wilson, Sexual Assault and Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder:  A Review of the Biological, Psy-
chological and Sociological Factors and Treatments, 9 
                                                
 11 http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/08-Panel_Reports/04_JPP 
_Retaliation_Report_Final_20160211.pdf. 
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McGill J. Med. 111, 112 (2006).12  Studies show that 
“depression occurred three times as often in women 
who were the victims of a sexual assault” in the mili-
tary and that “sexual assault or harassment was more 
closely related to anxiety symptoms than combat 
stress.”  Dep’t of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ 
at 50. 
A Veterans Affairs factsheet drives home the dev-
astating and far-reaching effects of sexual assault, in-
cluding strong emotions; feelings of numbness; trou-
ble sleeping; difficulties with attention, concentration, 
and memory; substance abuse; relationship difficul-
ties; and both physical and mental health problems.  
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Military Sexual Trauma 1–
2 (May 2015).13  Congress had ample reason to con-
clude that a crime inflicting this panoply of harms 
warrants the most severe punishment and should be 
prosecuted without regard to the passage of time. 
B. Underreporting Poses A Particular 
Challenge To Prosecuting Rape In The 
Military. 
Sexual assault “remain[s] chronically underre-
ported when compared to reporting rates for other 
forms of violent crime.”  Dep’t of Defense, Report of the 
Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes 
                                                
 12 The process of post-rape care and investigation can itself trig-
ger PTSD symptoms, referred to as “secondary victimization.”  Re-
becca Campbell & Sheela Raja, The Sexual Assault and Secondary 
Victimization of Female Veterans:  Help-Seeking Experiences with 
Military and Civilian Social Systems, 29 Psychology of Women Q. 
97, 97–106 (2005).  A truncated limitations period can amplify the 
false message that the victim’s trauma is not worth investigating. 
 13 https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/mst_general_factsheet 
.pdf. 
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Panel 8 (June 2014).14  Survivors are often reluctant 
to come forward given “society’s tendency to blame 
[them] for the crime” and because they “struggle[ ] 
with shame and self-blame; feelings of confusion, 
helplessness, and lack of control; and the fear of the 
consequences of reporting.”  Id. at 59.  Tragically, last 
year nearly 70 percent of sexual assault victims in the 
military did not report the crime.  Dep’t of Defense, 
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018 at 4, 10. 
For survivors of rape in the military, the problem 
is even worse—they “face unique barriers to reporting 
that do not exist in the civilian world.”  Dep’t of De-
fense, Response Systems at 60.  Chief among these is 
the “hierarchical structure” that “focus[es] on obedi-
ence, order, and mission before self” that rests at the 
heart of military service.  Ibid.  Enlisted members “are 
taught blind obedience to every order” and are trained 
“to subordinate themselves in service of the larger 
goals and needs of the unit.”  Id. at 62. 
While this structure may be crucial to military 
success, it frequently exacerbates the chronic problem 
of underreporting.  Id. at 60.  Where a perpetrator is 
a ranking superior, the survivor may be particularly 
wary of reporting as doing so may seem to go against 
the grain of “obedience” and “subordination”—in addi-
tion to concerns that “others will ignore or tend to dis-
believe their allegations.”  Id. at 60–62.  The problem 
is endemic.  Among women who reported penetrative 
sexual assault, nearly 60 percent were assaulted by 
someone with a higher rank, and nearly 25 percent 
were assaulted by someone in their chain of command.  
                                                
 14 http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/Public/docs/Reports/00 
_Final/RSP_Report_Final_20140627.pdf. 
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Dep’t of Defense, Office of People Analytics, 2018 
Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active 
Duty Members 34 (May 2019).15 
Moreover, given the close proximity in which ser-
vice members typically live and work, “sexual assault 
allegation[s] involving members of the same military 
unit may divide loyalties among a close-knit group of 
people who should be working toward a common goal.”  
Dep’t of Defense, Response Systems at 60.  Rather 
than risk the unity and cohesion of the unit, survivors 
of rape in the military often forego reporting in a 
tragic effort to place the unit’s well-being above their 
own.  See id. at 62 (“As one sexual assault victim told 
the Panel: * * * ‘I felt that reporting [the sexual as-
sault] would distract my unit and distract me from 
th[e] mission that I was given.’ ”). 
These considerations heighten the fear of reprisal 
that rape survivors often experience outside the mili-
tary context:  “The effects of retaliation on a victim can 
be particularly acute in the military environment be-
cause the accused and the victim often share the same 
community, the same peers, and the same mission.”  
Dep’t of Defense, Report on Retaliation at 16.  These 
concerns are not unfounded.  A 2014 survey by the 
RAND Corporation indicated that 62 percent of 
women on active military duty who reported un-
wanted sexual contact experienced some form of retal-
iation.  Id. at 3, 11. 
Similarly, the Department of Defense’s 2012 Work-
place and Gender Relations Survey revealed that 47 
percent of women who did not report unwanted sexual 
                                                
 15 https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA 
_Overview_Report.pdf. 
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contact were afraid of retaliation or thought they 
would be labeled as a troublemaker.  Dep’t of Defense, 
Response Systems at 60.  Just as troubling, 43 percent 
of these women did not report unwanted sexual con-
tact in light of the negative experience of other survi-
vors who did come forward, and 28 percent were con-
cerned that reporting would negatively affect their 
performance evaluation or chance for promotion.  Id. 
at 60–61.  This fear of retaliation works to “erode 
trust” in military organizations, “violates fundamen-
tal military values,” and “undermines a commander’s 
ability to maintain good order and discipline.”  Dep’t 
of Defense, Report on Retaliation at 17.  And it perpet-
uates an endless “cycle of sexual assault” and un-
derreporting.  Id. at 3. 
That outcome is precisely what Congress has long 
been committed to addressing by insisting that perpe-
trators of sexual violence in the military must face jus-
tice, no matter how long ago they committed their 
crimes, and no matter how great the pressure on sur-
vivors to remain silent.  Then and now, no statute of 
limitations prevents the prosecution of rape in the 
military—an offense so severe that Congress has de-
termined it warrants the severest punishment.  
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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